

The Politics of Religious Charity in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

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Good evening. I am pleased to see each of you and to be here and grateful to the Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Islamic Studies Program and to Kathryn Coughlin, its executive director, for hosting me. I am grateful to each of you for finding the time. If it weren't for you, I would not have written this paper, though I would have been up all night nevertheless, as I just got back from Bhutan on Monday and am still in the wrong time zone. *[slide 1]*

I would like to describe my book manuscript on the politics of religious charity in Pakistan and to hear your critical reflections. For me, this is a golden opportunity to think critically about the arguments as I prepare it for potential publishers. My intention is to submit the manuscript for publication at the end of January 2014, after another, month-long research trip to Pakistan. As I want to present the manuscript in its entirety, the presentation itself will be broad rather than deep. My hope is that parts of the presentation – which will take 40 minutes – will pique your interest. During the discussion period that will follow, we can go into depth in areas that might be of interest to you.

I begin the manuscript by asking 'What is the purpose of government?' One line of thinking is that the purpose of government is to create public goods, one of which is human security. Human security is the ability of people to protect themselves from harm. It is distinguished from 'national security,' which is the ability of government to protect the state, and its senior managers. I distinguish the state – an inanimate collection of institutions – and government – the people who manage the state. And I argue that this distinction is often not made in political science scholarship because it allows behavior to be ascribed to the state, an inanimate entity, falsely, rather than to those individuals who control the state,

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the government. This allows political scientists, if they want, to write with greater ease, to avoid important moral questions, and to avoid annoying the officials whom they want to get information from.

If creation of public goods is the purpose of government itself, is the private provision of public goods a threat to the legitimacy of government? Pakistan is an ideal place to examine this question because Pakistani governments have a poor record in providing and protecting public goods and because philanthropists, predominantly religiously motivated, have attempted to deliver where government has failed. [slide 2]

A telling example of this phenomenon is that before the government established the National Disaster Management Authority, just three years ago, the *de facto* national emergency response system, an important public good, was run by an old man, Abdul Sattar Edhi, his family, and those whom he inspired. The government provided the Edhi Foundation with a three-digit countrywide emergency phone number – 115 – so that people facing emergencies could call his foundation.

What is the state of everyday human security in Pakistan and what are the sources of security and insecurity, in Pakistan? Basic education, primary health, and emergency assistance are the most important and foundational dimensions of human security. Pakistanis suffer some of the lowest achievements in education and health in the world, far below the levels that Pakistan's per capita income permit. One source of low levels of everyday human security in Pakistan is the priority that the government has placed on 'national security.' Another source of insecurity in Pakistan is the behavior of government itself.

Having introduced the main questions and concerns in chapters one and two, chapters three and four introduce the reader to Islamic social welfare, in theory and as practiced in Pakistan. What are the principal tenets of Islam related to social welfare? The chapter discusses various forms of *khairat* [charity] and *infaq* [spending to please God], including *awqaf* [religious endowments], *qurbani* [distribution of meat of sacrificed animals at Eid ul Adha] (Eid Mubarak), *sadqah* [voluntary charity], *zakaat* [mandatory charity], and *khums* [Shia charity]. What are the principal social welfare practices in Pakistan associated with Islam? The chapter discusses the *langar* [free food kitchens], *madaris* [Islamic seminary], the *dargah* [Sufi shrine], *imambargah* [Shia congregation hall], and *jamatkhana* [Ismaeli congregation hall]. [slide 3]

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The *langar*, to take up one of these institutions, does not feed all of Pakistan's hungry people, but it is a countrywide food security service. Anybody who can make it to a *langar*, which run 365 days a year at several hundred shrines, and less regularly but more extensively at private *langar*, is assured of a free meal, if only *roti* and *dal*. I have not heard of a *langar* closing, of being accused of corruption, or having substandard food. I have heard reports of government run *dargah*, which are importantly the sites of both corporate and private *langar*, that drug use is facilitated there, and I have heard that these opportunities for intoxication also constitute a kind of public good.

I also discuss the *madaris*. The Islamic seminaries, commonly referred to as *madaris*, were not designed to be institutions of social welfare. They were designed to impart knowledge of Islam to a younger generation of future *ulema* [Islamic scholars]. But *madaris* have become an important social welfare institution, especially for poorer children and orphans, and their parents.¹

Madaris are an integral part of national education in Pakistan. And *madaris* have done a remarkable job of reaching large segments of the Pakistani public with virtually no government support and very modest funding from the public. They have schooled, clothed, and educated this population, however, largely within the tradition of one *maslaq* [denomination]. Not all have inculcated tolerance toward other *maslaq*. This is not the fault of the *madaris* educators. Pakistani governments require *madaris* to affiliate with a *maslaqi* organization and thereby discourage non- *maslaqi* education.

It must be noted that the estimate of 500,000 *madaris* full-time students by Andrabi et al in 2005 is not credible. It is based on faulty statistical methods and a weak understanding of whether Pakistanis consider a *madrasah* to be an *iskool*, as I explain in "Pakistan's Recent Experience in Reforming Islamic Education" a chapter in Jamal Malik's *Madrasas in South Asia*. Establishment surveys find that there are about two million full-time, residential *madaris* students in Pakistan. Many more attend *madaris* on a part-time basis, for the religious education rather

¹ In American and European usage, an orphan has lost both parents. As in neighboring countries, in Pakistan the term 'orphan' is used for children who have a deceased father. Thus, in Pakistan, orphans can have parents.

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than for the free accommodations, food, and other provisions that residential students are provided.²

Pakistanis, at home and abroad contribute large amounts of money, goods, and labor, to charities. According to a survey conducted by the Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy, which was at the time of the survey a project of the Aga Khan Foundation, residents of the province of Punjab reported that they donated in cash, kind, and labor the equivalent of Rs. 103.7 billion in 2010. This is more than 28 times the amount that corporations reportedly donated in the province over the same period and 95 percent of total provincial government revenue in the revenue.³ Rs. 103.7 billion was equivalent to US \$ 1.20 billion in 2010. These contributions go largely to individuals and to the religious institutions, some of which are taken by the government (as at the 600 major and government-run shrines and their public *langar*).

It seems that two thirds of all Pakistanis living outside of Pakistan, 3.9 million out of 6 million people, make contributions to philanthropic activities in Pakistan through formal banks. Estimate of the total annual volume of overseas contributions are as high as US\$ 5.5 billion.⁴ I need to subject such claims to further investigation. But it is clear that these contributions – according to the donors – go largely to registered social welfare associations, such as the Citizens Foundation and the Edhi Foundation, and to the social welfare associations of political parties, such as Al Khidmat Welfare Foundation, which is affiliated with the Jamaat i Islami, and to Khidmat e Khalq, which is affiliated to the Muttahida Quami Movement.

Now we're on to chapters five and six, a section of the manuscript intended for those who are not already very well informed about the political construction of Muslim identities in Pakistan. The manuscript provides an overview of Muslim

² See Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Das, Asim Ijaz Khwaja, and Tristan Zajonc, *Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan: A Look at the Data*, (Washington D.C.: Policy Research Working Paper Series, Number 3521, 2005) and "Pakistan's Recent Experience in Reforming Islamic Education" in Jamal Malik, ed., *Madrasas in South Asia: Teaching Terror?*, (Abingdon: RoutledgeCurzon, 2007).

³ See Jennifer Bennett, "Philanthropic Spirit," *Business Recorder*, December 12, 2012.

⁴ Zubair K. Bhatti, "Diaspora Giving: An Agent of Change in Asia Pacific Communities? Pakistan," paper presented at the Diaspora Philanthropy Conference, Hanoi, May 2008, available at www.asiapacificphilanthropy.org/files/APPC_DiasporaGiving_Pakistan.pdf, 185.

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identities in Pakistan, explains the rationale for making Pakistan's public institutions 'Islamic,' and introduces Pakistan's "religious" parties.

What are the principal Muslim identities in Pakistan? The vast majority of South Asian Muslims were attracted to Islam through its devotional (or Sufi) traditions. One can trace the emergence of other Muslim identities to two distinct Muslim reactions to the suppression of the Muslim community that fought the Great Indian Mutiny (otherwise known as the First Indian War of Independence) in 1857-58. The two distinct responses quickly led to identities that formed in association with a specific educational curriculum: modernist and conservative. Modernists, such as Mohammad Ali Jinnah, have dominated governments in Pakistan. They accepted that they needed to embrace British education and culture. Conservatives, known as Deobandi after their madrasah in Deoband, rejected British education and culture and embraced the *madaris* as the proper form of education. A third identity, the traditional (or Sufi) or Brelvi Muslim – being rural – was not as dramatically effected by British suppression of mutineers as were the modernist and conservative. These identities are expressed in Pakistan today as specific denominations (*maslaq*) and specific political parties. Later, a fourth identity organized around a specific political party, the Jamaat i Islami, which idolizes the politics of the Prophet Mohammad's Medina. [slide 4]

Today there are five influential *maslaq* in Pakistan: Brelvi (Sufi), Deobandi (conservative), Jamaat-i-Islami (revivalist), Jafri (Shia), and Ahle-Hadiths (Wahabi). Each are associated with political parties and militant outfits.

The movement for Pakistan was opposed by political parties that professed to be Islamic because they objected to the creation of a secular state and to those who would manage it. How then did Islam come to be the ideology of Pakistan? How were institutions of governance made 'Islamic'? [slide 5]

I argue that 'Islamic-ization' is not the project of anti-modernist and anti-government *ulema* but is rather the project of successive governments of modernist Muslims to secure revenue and legitimacy for the state and to undermine rival sources of authority.⁵ I use the concept of 'Islamic-ization' (not Islamization) to make clear (through an admittedly discontinant Latin formulation) that the process is the result of an intention to make things appear as if they were 'Islamic.'

⁵ Malik makes this argument in his *Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan*, (Lahore: Vanguard 1996).

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For example, some lead others to confuse ‘Arab’ with ‘Islamic’ and refer to this as ‘Islamization.’ Some emphasize imposing what they proclaim to be ‘Islamic’ over discussing and deliberating over what is in accordance with the spirit of Islam. I refer to these as processes of ‘Islamic-ization’ so that we can distinguish between the adoption of Arab culture and the suppression of deliberation, on the one hand, and a process of adopting the spirit of Islam, on the other.

[Blind obedience to religious injunctions can produce the opposite of the intended benefit. Observance of *Ramzan* in many Muslim societies provides a clear illustration of such perversity. A major benefit of fasting from before dawn until after dusk during the month of *Ramzan* is to allow those who have the means to eat and drink whenever they please to know the experience of those who do not have the means to eat or drink whenever they feel like it. The idea is that the experience of fasting – not consuming or ‘enjoying’ when one feels like it - will encourage the wealthy to provide extra care for the needy. Accordingly, *zakaat* is to be given in the month of *Ramzan*. Many Muslims are quite strict about not letting any food or drink touch their lips between dawn and dusk. Many will not brush their teeth or take medicine. At the same time, many Muslims gorge themselves and consume expensive specialty dishes during *sahur* [the pre-dawn meal] and *iftar* [the post-dusk dinner]. As a result, food prices increase dramatically during *Ramzan*, making it even more difficult than usual for the poor to eat. Basically, chapter six argues that Pakistani governments, and many Pakistanis, have made an idol of Islam, a religion that, like all good Abrahamic religions, takes seriously the first and second commandments and thus is firmly opposed to idol worship.]

Having presented the foundational questions in chapter one and the background requisite for the necessary political inquiries in Pakistan in chapters two through six, I discuss my research strategy in chapter seven. [slide 6]

Thanks to a grant from the American Institute of Pakistan Studies in 2010 I worked in Islamabad and Lahore in 2011 and 2012, and thanks to grants from Wellesley College I worked in other parts of Pakistan in 2012 and 2013. I conducted more than 300 interviews and made site visits to 140 philanthropic associations in Pakistan. [slide 7]

I toured facilities and observed activities, from Karimabad in northern Gilgit-Baltistan to Karachi in southern Sindh and from Abdullah Goth in Balochistan to Gaji Mala on the Kutch border with India.

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I met and spoke with beneficiaries and their family members. I interviewed leadership, paid and volunteer staff, and donors. In the manuscript, I go into these methodological issues, and into epistemological issues as well. These relate to being a white American male doing research in contemporary Pakistan.

We have reached the heart of the manuscript. What are religious charities doing in Pakistan? What are the expressed motivations of those who donate and those who run charities? What are the assessments of beneficiaries? How does involvement in the religious provision of public goods – as benefactors or beneficiaries – effect people’s sense of citizenship? [slide 8]

To answer these questions, I begin by distinguishing between four kinds of charities: (1) those that are based at religious institutions, such as the *langar*, *madaris*, *dargah*, *imambargah*, and *jamatkhana*, and are not registered as social welfare associations; (2) those that are non-partisan and are registered with the government as social welfare associations; (3) those that are associated with political parties or militant movements; and (4) those that are administered by government. Each gets a chapter. Each type comes in many varieties.

Religious charity is in the weave of South Asian society. It is also the source of political influence of many influential political families. In Pakistan, several places and social practices such as *madaris*, *jamatkhana* and *imanbargah*, *dargah* and their *langar*, provide the essential social welfare services that educate and keep alive millions of Pakistanis.

The *dargah* of Shahbaz Qalandar in Sewan is owned and managed by the Government of Sindh’s Awqaf Department. The worshippers, who are both benefactors and beneficiaries, are apparently from all classes and all three genders. Shortly before I visited the shrine in August 2013, the *langari* was murdered, alleged by Taliban whom are stationed at the shrine, who placed their own man there. This was reported to me by people in Sewan who are in positions to know.

The religiously organized, funded, or named philanthropic activities in pre-partition Pakistan were predominantly Christian, Parsi, and Sikh. These include the Karachi Social Work Group of Jamshed Nusravanji Mehta, the President of the Karachi Parsi community in Karachi and of course what are now the main

hospitals of major cities.⁶ Even after the nationalization of some of these hospitals, which are receiving *zakaat* funds that the government makes mandatory of Sunni Muslims, most of the nurses in these hospitals are Christian, as they were when these hospitals were founded. And Christian philanthropies remained very significant in the field of education after independence, before the nationalization of private schools in 1972.

Religious charities began to register in the 1860s when the law first required registration. 1860 was an important year in the administration of India. It was just two years after the East India Company almost lost India. The new Imperial government wanted to have more control. The registration requirements were not one tenth as complicated as those in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts today. Still, previously fluid social associations had to provide the authorities a workplace and the name and home address of the people who were liable for the association's activities. Today, there are tens of thousands of social welfare associations in Pakistan registered with provincial governments. Most of them are registered as societies, trusts, and voluntary social welfare agencies, which are categories still defined and authorized by British law that remains in effect. Others are registered as non-profit companies, under post-independence law.

Party-affiliated religious charities are a more recent phenomenon. Each party that claims to be 'Islamic' runs at least one social welfare association. And some parties that claim to be secular are also running 'Islamic' charities. But the relationships between parties and charities are diverse and distinct. [slide 9]

The Awami National Party and the Muttahida Quami Movement have social welfare associations – the Baccha Khan Trust and the Khidmat e Khalq – that are an integral component of the party. In contrast, the Jamaat i Islami has severed the legal connection between the party and their social welfare associations so as to be able to access international funding, including from the Japan International Cooperation Agency. But these associations are run by the same *rukun* [senior members of the Jamaat i Islami, literally pillars] who ran the associations when they reported directly to the Jamaat i Islami *Shura*. The Jamiat ul Ulema-i-Islam and the Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan are associated with extensive social welfare programs, but the base of these are *madaris*, about half of which are not registered with government. The chapter also discusses

⁶ Hina Khan, “Development and Growth of Nonprofit Sector in Pakistan” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation for the Department of History, University of Karachi, 2013, 109.

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the charities related to the Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz, namely the Ittefaq Foundation, the Ittefaq Hospital, Sharrif Medical City, and the Sharrif Trust; the charities associated with the Pakistan Awami Tehreek (Pakistan People’s Movement) the political party of the noted scholar and founder of Minhaj Welfare Foundation Tahir ul Qadri; and the charities of the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (Pakistan Movement for Justice) the political party of Imran Khan, former national cricket team captain and founder of Shaukat Khanum Memorial Cancer Hospital.

We move now to consider government run social welfare associations. There is too much to say here. Governments have nationalized religious educational institutions and *awqaf* and made *zakaat* payments to the government mandatory. I’ll focus on the government-enforced collection of *zakat*. General Zia ul Haq, President and Martial Law Administrator, promulgated the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance in 1980, thereby making *zakaat* a form of government taxation. The governments of Pakistan and Sudan are the only governments that make *zakaat* payment to the government mandatory of (some) Muslims.⁷ The Zakat and Ushr Ordinance created the Ministry of Zakat and Ushr and authorizes the government to collect 2.5 per cent from all individual and corporate accounts and stock assets and 5 or 10 per cent of assets depending on whether they are derived from non-irrigated and irrigated land. The federal Central Zakat Committee collects about US \$ 200 million in state enforced *zakat*, this is far less than 2.5% of all accounts because many empty their accounts before the deductions are made and replenish their accounts the day after. This makes zakat deduction days the most popular day for robbery.

People would rather distribute *zakaat* with their own hands than let the government do it for them. Additionally, people think that the government misappropriates *zakaat* funds. When Pakistan faced a debt crisis under then Chief Executive and Chief of Army Staff Pervez Musharraf, the Islamic Ideology Council, which is run by the same ministry that collects *zakaat*, ruled that it was appropriate in Islam to use *zakaat* funds to pay down the national debt on the argument that the entire nation was in debt, and that one of the seven categories of *mustaqeen* (those eligible for *zakaat*) is debtors. In fiscal year 2011-12, the Zakat and Ushr Ministry spent Rs. 69.21 million on advertizing in violation of the

⁷ *Philanthropy in Pakistan: A Report of the Initiative on Indigenous Philanthropy*, (Aga Khan Development Network, 2000), 4 notes that “Sudan and Pakistan are the only Muslim states (sic) to operate an ‘official’ *zakat* system.”

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Zakat and Ushr Ordinance. In the same year, the Zakat and Ushr Ministry spent another Rs. 286.1 million on the “administrative expenses” of *zakaat* committees in Punjab that were not functional, according to the Auditor General of Pakistan.⁸

Shia Muslims constitute between 20 and 30 percent of the population, and have different beliefs and practices for observation of *zakaat*.⁹ As an article of faith, Shia contribute their *zakaat* [called *khums*] directly to their own *zakaat* and welfare associations and to the *aulad-i-Rasul* [descendants of the Prophet]. There is an opt out from the otherwise automatic deduction for Shia account holders, and non-Muslim account holders, but many Shia resent having to make the declaration that they are not, in the eyes of the law, normal Muslim who need not file an exemption affidavit. Indeed, the *zakaat* ordinance spurred the formation of a militant Shia party, the Tehriq-i-Nifaz-i-Faqah Jaffri. And the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance also creates problems within the government. The Sindh government recently announced that it will retain the *zakaat* funds that it collects rather than turning them over to the central government, which distributes most *zakaat* funds to Punjab.

Government fails to create public goods, and even nationalizes and destroys those public goods that people make for themselves. Provincial governments manage most of these *dargah* but expenses are covered by pilgrims’ donations to the *dargah* not by government tax revenue. I am building on Jamal Malik’s dissertation “Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan.”

I find it interesting that all four kinds of religious charities delineated above – even those at opposite ends of ideologies – advocate “an Islamic welfare state.”
[slide 10]

Before stating my findings, I leave the local perspective of my research in Pakistan and take up a comparative perspective. I do this to test the claim that government promotion of a single religion destroys public goods. I note that in Turkey, the conversion of *madaris* into Hatip-Iman vocational schools, made Islamic education economically viable. I note that in Indonesia, where state ideology embraces religion but no particular religion, the Islamic social welfare

⁸ “Warped Priorities: Zakat Funds Used for Publicity Drive: Auditors,” *The Express Tribune*, (June 13, 2011), 2

⁹ Pakistan’s censuses do not collect figures on who is Shia.

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sector is powerful and non-sectarian. And I describe how, when Bangladesh was still East Pakistan, it implemented the *madaris* reforms that were successfully opposed by *ulema* in West Pakistan. As a result, Bangladesh now has respected government run *madaris*, unlike Pakistan. In Pakistan, in contrast, only three *madaris* are supported by the government of Pakistan; and they have trouble filling seats. [slide 11]

I drafted a chapter on links to the Gulf countries, and include discussion of the work of the Emir of the United Arab Emirates. But I need to decide whether not knowing Arabic I am out of my depth here, and should file that chapter. A reason for keeping the chapter is that contributions from Gulf countries are significant.¹⁰ Many Pakistanis allege that these projects are used to promote anti-Sufi ideologies.

It is now time to return to our opening question and, mercifully, to conclude. Is it detrimental to government legitimacy that essential welfare services, including basic education, basic and emergency health care, and disaster relief, are provided privately by religious organizations including political parties that aim to establish an Islamic welfare state? My estimates are that in Pakistan the private religious sector is providing more medical care and emergency relief as are governments, provincial and federal, are and about as much education as governments are.

There are three dominant arguments that suggest that the private provision of public goods is detrimental to a properly functioning society. The first begins

¹⁰ The Emir of the United Arab Emirates, Shaikh Khalifa Zayid, for example, married two sisters from Rahim Yar Khan. To give back to the people of Pakistan especially those people from where his wives were born, the Sheikh had built the Sheikh Khalifa School in Bahawalpur, the Sheikh Rashid School at Yazman, the Sheikh Khalifa Girls School in Rahim Yar Khan, the Sheikh Khalifa Education Centre in Rahim Yar Khan, the Sheikh Zayid International School in Islamabad, the Sheikh Zayid Hospital and Medical College in Lahore, the Sheikh Khalifa Medical Complex in Quetta, the Sheikh Khalifa Hospitals in Muzaffarabad, the Sheikh Khalifa Hospital in Rojhan, the Sheikh Khalifa Hospitals in Rawalakot, the Sheikh Zayed Hospital in Larkana, the Sheikh Zayid Hospital in Rahim Yar Khan, Sheikh Khalifa Hospital in Kharan, the Sheikh Zayid Medical Centre in Mirpur Sakro, the Sheikh Khalifa Health Care Unit in Basima (District Washuk), the Mother and Child Health Care Centre in Okara, the Sheikh Zayid Rehabilitation Centre for Drug Dependents in Rahim Yar Khan, the Sheikh Khalifa Boat Bridge over the Indus River which connects Rojhan with Rahim Yar Khan, and the Sheikh Zayid Airports in Rahim Yar Khan and in Bahawalpur. Other UAE Sheikhs have built and donated to the government other projects.

by noting that much of the private provision of social welfare takes a religious form. In Pakistan, that means that the private provision of public goods tends to be articulated in Islamic terms. Those who work with non-governmental organizations that are supported by European and North American donors are accustomed to operating within secular discourses. But there are massive commitments to the creation of public social welfare goods in Pakistan made by donors whose inspiration is not to change the existing social structure but to collect merit.

The consequences of the provision of public social welfare goods as a religious duty are complex. One consequence is that some make a public display of their religiosity by publicizing their good work. Another is that the dominant cultural interpretation of religious guidance can deprive people of their rights. For example, the dominant cultural interpretation of Islam in Pakistan as it relates to family planning is that Islam prohibits it and that the Quran enjoins parents to have large families. Nothing in the Quran enjoins parents to have large families. Indeed, the Prophet Mohammad advised his followers to use birth control if they wanted to limit the size of their families. At the same time, he cautioned those who use birth control to keep in mind that whether they have children or not is God's will. Muslim associations in other countries – including Indonesia and Iran – have successfully made the connection between birth control and healthy and pious families. Very few of the dozens of clinics and hospitals that I have visited in Pakistan admit to offering family planning advice or contraceptives. The private provision of social welfare through religious associations is less than ideal in countries, like Pakistan, where government has an antagonistic relationship with private social associations because religious ideologies can prevent people from claiming their human rights.

The second dominant argument against the private provision of social welfare is that it undermines a sense of citizenship. A vicious cycle of declining revenue for government organized social welfare programs and declining trust in government makes it difficult for government to maintain legitimacy and to raise revenue. Citizenship allows individuals to make claims on the government, for after all the government's resources derived from the citizenry.¹¹ The relationship of the needy to private social welfare associations is qualitatively different. The very concept of citizenship is challenged if private actors determine who has access to social welfare.

¹¹ I do acknowledge that about half of Pakistani government revenue is obtained externally.

The third major argument against the private provision of public social welfare goods is that it lowers popular demands on government for better attention to social needs. Some private social welfare associations do aim to establish an Islamic Welfare State by building a parallel state. But none want to excuse government for its shortcomings. Most social welfare associations consider themselves to be doing work that government should be doing. But without the work of thousands of formal and informal private social welfare associations that serve tens of millions of Pakistanis, there would be, it is argued, much greater pressure on the government to provide public goods.

To put this last major criticism in perspective, one might recall the response of Florence Nightingale to Henri Dunant's proposal in 1862 that "in time of peace... relief societies with the aim of providing care for the wounded in time of war [be formed] by zealous volunteers properly qualified for such work."¹² Nightingale wrote in opposition that:

such a society would take upon itself duties which out to be performed by the government of each country and so would relieve them of responsibilities which really belong to them and which only they can properly discharge and being relieved of which would make war more easy.¹³

Today, it is difficult to imagine that civilians and prisoners of war would be better treated if the Red Cross, which gave us the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols had never formed, as Miss Nightingale wanted. It is not necessary that citizens create public goods only through government. The existence of government is not a good reason for citizens to refrain from private collaborations to provide for essential social welfare, because effective resource use is not aided by zero-sum assumptions about division of assets.

There are also three potential positive consequences of the private provision of public social welfare. First, government is bureaucratically arranged to provide agencies with a single exclusive domain of authority. That is, for example, however desirable it might be to have schoolteachers administer inoculations

¹² from Dunant's *Un Souvenir de Solferino*, which made the original proposal for the Committee of the Red Cross, formed in 1864, as quoted in Angela Bennett, *The Geneva Convention: The Hidden Origins of the Red Cross*, (Glouchestershire, Sutton Publishing, 2005), 27

¹³ as quoted in Angela Bennett, *The Geneva Convention: The Hidden Origins of the Red Cross*, (Glouchestershire, Sutton Publishing, 2005), 28

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against childhood diseases, Ministries of Education do not conduct childhood inoculation campaigns and Ministries of Health do not supervise teachers. Indeed, when Punjab's government required schoolteachers to provide students with the polio vaccine, the Lahore High Court prevented the government from taking action against teachers who refused.¹⁴ Teachers argued that "during the anti-polio campaign, teachers with a master's degree have to work under the supervision of a matriculate or under-matriculate vaccinator which is itself a disgrace for the educators."¹⁵ The schoolteacher's comment suggests that government departmentalization replicates and reinforces class segregation, which is arguably the major reason that government in Pakistan is not capable of providing social services to the poor.

Private social welfare organizations are more easily integrated than government bureaucracies. Indeed, my observation is that religious charities are one of the last institutions in Pakistan that permit people to work together across classes, generations, and genders. And workers in social welfare organizations are less likely to insist that necessary duties are beneath them. Most private social welfare organizations have integrated activities, including education, health, micro-credit, skill enhancement, income generation, and marriage and funeral services. And many social welfare organizations workers do whatever work required, even if that work is menial. The private provision of social welfare services allows for greater integration and commitment than government provision of social welfare services.

Another consequence of the private provision of public social welfare is that associations compete with and can learn from one another. In the process, philanthropies learn from one another and try to improve on other organizations. The Aman Foundation in Karachi, for example, has borrowed the Edhi Foundation's model of low-cost ambulatory services and has improved on it by including life-saving equipment and trained medical staff onboard each ambulance. At the same time, under the leadership of Faisal Edhi, the Edhi Foundation has upgraded its on board equipment and training of emergency responders.

Third, government can learn from private welfare associations. The government, for example, has attempted to replicate the Aga Khan Rural Support

¹⁴ Malik Asad, "Court Backs Teachers," *Dawn*, July 27, 2012, 15

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, citing Raja Sajid Mehmood, a schoolteacher.

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Program. Some have argued that the AKRSP has introduced the government to an entirely new development paradigm.¹⁶

But competitive philanthropy also has a downside. In some cases, the social welfare associations that are connected or ideologically affiliated to political parties are in conflict. MQM's Khidmat-i-Khalq workers have had fatal clashes with the Jamaat-i-Islami's Al Khidmat Welfare Foundation workers over *qurbani* collections in Karachi. And the Awami National Party's new Baacha Khan Trust Educational Foundation schools in Karachi is likely to be challenged, and violently, by the MQM's Khidmat-i-Khalq.

Overall, my finding is that religious charities are not a threat to the legitimacy of government. It is the reverse. Governments, in Pakistan at least, are a threat to religious charities and to their ability to create public goods, specifically everyday human security, the ability of people to keep themselves alive.

I conclude the manuscript with a post-script about U.S. generated human insecurity in Pakistan. Support for the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies, from 1954 until 1990 and from 2001 until today; U.S. Presidential Ordinances supposed to prevent financing of terrorism; followed by drone bombing and covert operations since 2004 have had a powerful and negative effect on everyday human security in Pakistan and on the capacity of religious charities to provide everyday human security. But rather than weave that claim into the manuscript, I take it up in a separate chapter.

I am very eager to hear your thoughts and to try to answer any questions.

¹⁶ This was one of the lessons taught by Fayyaz Baqir in a course on "Human Development in Pakistan" that I taught with him in 2012 as a videoconference course between Wellesley College and Fatima Jinnah Women University.